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Abstract 
It is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at least one 
stable matching, and that such a matching can be found in O(n’) time by application of the 
Gale/Shapley algorithm. In the classical version of the problem, each person must rank the members 
of the opposite sex in strict order of preference. 
In practical applications, a person may not wish (or be able) to choose between alternatives, thus 
allowing ties in the preference lists (or, more generally, allowing each preference list to be a partial 
order). With the introduction of such ind@rence, the notion of stability may be generalised in three 
obvious ways. For the weakest extension of stability, the same existence result holds, and essentially 
the same algorithm may be applied. In the other two cases, however, there is no guarantee that stable 
matchings exist. Nonetheless, in this paper, we describe polynomial-time algorithms that will 
establish, in either of these two cases, whether a matching of the appropriate kind exists, and if so will 
find such a matching. 
Keywords. Stable marriage, matching, polynomial-time algorithms. 
1. Introduction 
An instance of the classical stable marriage problem involves n men and n women, 
each of whom ranks all the members of the opposite sex in strict order of preference. 
A complete matching of the men and women is unstable if there is a man m and 
a woman w who are not partners but each of whom prefers the other to his/her partner 
in the matching. Such a pair is said to block, or to be a blocking pair for, the matching. 
Naturally, a matching for which there is no blocking pair is said to be stable. We use 
the term in other obvious ways-a man-woman pair (m, w) is a stable pair if there is 
some stable matching in which m and w are partners, in which case each is a stable 
partner of the other. 
A generalisation of the stable marriage problem, usually referred to as the stable 
roommates problem, involves a single set of 2n people, each of whom ranks all of the 
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others in strict order of preference. The definition of a blocking pair and of a stable 
matching is analogous to that for the stable marriage case. 
The classical results in stable marriage are the Gale/Shapley theorem and algorithm 
Cl]-the theorem asserts that at least one stable matching exists for every stable 
marriage instance, and the algorithm finds such a matching in O(n’) time. For the 
stable roommates problem, there is no guarantee that a stable matching exists for any 
particular instance, but in this case, there is also an O(n’) algorithm that will 
determine such a matching if one exists [3]. 
Much progress has recently been made in understanding the mathematical struc- 
ture underlying stable matching problems of this kind, and this understanding has led 
to new efficient algorithms for a range of associated problems. A comprehensive 
discussion of this work appears in [2]. 
Instances of the stable marriage problem arise in a number of practical contexts 
where algorithms such as that of Gale and Shapley are directly applicable. Many of the 
practical applications in this area are covered in [8]. However, in practical instances, it 
is perhaps unrealistic to expect each participant to provide a strict preference ordering 
of all of his/her prospective partners. If indifference is permitted, so that each person’s 
preference list becomes a partial order, the character of the problems changes some- 
what. We concentrate our attention on the particular case in which each person’s 
preference list is allowed to contain ties, but it is not hard to show that all of the results 
can be extended to the general case of partially ordered preference lists. 
We consider three possibilities for the appropriate definition of stability in this 
setting. A matching will be called weakly stable unless there is a couple each of whom 
strictly prefers the other to his/her partner in the matching. It is not hard to see that, in 
the stable marriage case, if ties are broken arbitrarily, any matching that is stable 
in the resulting (strict) instance is weakly stable in the original instance. So 
the Gale/Shapley algorithm (or other algorithms that find a stable matching in the 
classical case) may be applied in this context to find a weakly stable matching. On the 
other hand, it has recently been proved [7], perhaps rather surprisingly, that the stable 
roommates problem with ties in NP-complete under this notion of weak stability. 
Two alternative, stronger notions of stability also suggest themselves. A matching is 
strongly stable if there is no couple x, y such that x strictly prefers y to his/her partner, 
and y either strictly prefers x to his/her partner or is indifferent between them. 
A matching is super-stable if there is no couple each of whom either strictly prefers the 
other to his/her partner or is indifferent between them. 
It is easy to find instances of both stable marriage with ties and stable roommates 
with ties for which no strongly stable matching and/or no super-stable matching 
exists. For example, in a situation of complete indifference, in which no person has any 
strict preferences, there obviously cannot be a super-stable matching. In the instance 
of size 2 described by the preference lists in Fig. 1, in which all preferences are strict 
except those of man 2 (indicated by the parantheses in the preference list of man 2) 
there is no strongly stable matching. For the matching ((1, l), (2,2)} is blocked by the 
pair (2, l), while the matching {(1,2), (2, l)} is blocked by the pair (2,2). 
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Fig. 1. An instance with no strongly stable matching. 
It is our purpose in this paper to describe polynomial-time algorithms, for the stable 
marriage problem with ties, to determine whether a strongly stable or super-stable 
matching exists, and if so to find such a matching. The corresponding problems for 
stable roommates, however, remain open. 
2. The (extended) Gale/Shapley algorithm 
As a prelude to the algorithms for super-stable and strongly stable matchings, we 
describe an extended version of the classical Gale/Shapley algorithm that forms the 
basis of each of the new algorithms. The proof of the correctness of this algorithm may 
be found in [2]. Alternatively, since each of Algorithms SUPER and STRONG of 
Sections 3 and 4 reduces to it in the special case of strict preferences, the proofs 
of correctness of these algorithms apply, in simplified form, to the extended 
Gale/Shapley algorithm. 
Informally, the algorithm may be expressed in terms of a sequence of “proposals” 
from the men to the women (or from the women to the men if the roles of men and 
women are reversed throughout). At any point during the algorithm’s execution, each 
person is either engaged or free; each man may alternate between being engaged and 
being free, but once a woman is engaged, she is never again free, although the identity 
of her fiance may change. A man who becomes engaged more than once obtains 
fiancees who are successively less desirable to him, while each successive engagement 
brings a woman a more favoured partner. 
When a woman receives a proposal she will immediately (but provisionally) accept 
it, becoming engaged to the proposer, simultaneously breaking her current engage- 
ment, if any, and setting her previous fiance free. Each proposal in the sequence is 
made by a free man m to the first woman w on his current preference list, and results in 
the deletion from w’s list of all of the successors of m, and of w from the list of each of 
these men. We shall refer to the deletion of the pair (m, w). It is in respect of this 
reduction of the preference lists that the algorithm described is an extension of the 
classical Gale/Shapley algorithm. 
The proposal sequence continues until everyone is engaged, a state of affairs that is 
bound to arise before any man’s list becomes empty. This is because, if some man m’s 
list becomes empty, then every woman must be engaged to a man whom she prefers to 
m, giving a contradiction since no man is multiply engaged and the numbers of men 
and women are equal. On termination, the engaged pairs constitute a stable matching. 
Notice that the algorithm involves an element of nondeterminism, since the order in 
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assign each person to be free; 
while some man m is free do 
begin 
w := first woman on m’s list; 
m proposes, and becomes engaged, to w; 
if some man p is engaged to w then 
assign p to be free; 
for each successor m’ of m on w’s list do 
delete the pair (WI’, w) 
end; 
output the engaged pairs, which form a stable matching 
Fig. 2. The extended Gale/Shapley algorithm, Algorithm EGS. 
which the free men propose is not specified. However, as is implicit in the statement of 
Theorem 2.1 below, this nondeterminism is immaterial to the outcome of the algo- 
rithm. 
Figure 2 contains a description of the algorithm, which we shall refer to as 
Algorithm EGS. 
The following theorem summarises the effect of this extended Gale/Shapley 
algorithm. 
Theorem 2.1. For every instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preferences, 
every execution of Algorithm EGS jinds the unique stable matching in which every man 
has his best possible, and every woman her worst possible, stable partner (the so-called 
man-optimal / woman- “pessimal” stable matching). 
Analysis of the extended Gale/Shapley algorithm. It is not hard to devise a data 
structure that provides a faithful representation of the current preference lists 
throughout the execution of the algorithm, and such that the operations of locating 
one person in the list of another, deleting a pair, locating the first or last entry in a list, 
and locating the successor of an entry in a list can all be achieved in constant time. 
With such a data structure, the total number of operations carried out during the 
execution of the extended Gale/Shapley algorithm is bounded by a constant times the 
number of pairs deleted plus the number of engaged pairs, and since the total number 
of man-woman pairs is n2, the algorithm has an O(n’) worst-case time bound. 
An Q(n2) lower bound has recently been established for the problem of finding 
a stable matching in the stable marriage problem [S], so that the (extended) 
Gale/Shapley algorithm is asymptotically optimal in the worst case. 
3. Super-stable matchings 
We extend the terminology of the classical stable marriage problem to the case of 
super-stable matchings. For example, a man-woman pair (m, w) is a super-stable pair if 
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there is some super-stable matching in which they are partners; each is said to be 
a super-stable partner of the other. Further, when we use the terms block or blocking 
pair in this section, it is in the sense of super-stability. 
It turns out that the extended Gale/Shapley algorithm of Section 2 can be amended in 
a quite straightforward way to find a super-stable matching, or to establish that no 
super-stable matching exists. The proposal sequence proceeds in the usual way, except 
that a free man who has two or more women tied at the head of his current list proposes 
to all of them simultaneously. When a woman receives a proposal, all men strictly 
inferior to the proposer are deleted from her list, and she from theirs, but she may hold 
more than one proposal if the men in question are tied in her list. The proposal sequence 
may terminate with one or more of the men’s lists empty, in which case no super-stable 
matching exists. Otherwise, each man will be engaged to one or more women, and the 
fiancC(e)s of any multiply engaged person must be tied in his/her list. 
As we will show, no woman who is multiply engaged at this point can have 
a super-stable partner from among any of her fiances, nor from among any men who 
may be tied with them in her list. So all such pairs may be deleted and the proposal 
sequence re-activated. The whole process is repeated until it produces a one-one 
engagement mapping, which will be a super-stable matching, or until some man’s list 
becomes empty, indicating that no super-stable matching is possible. 
The algorithm appears as Algorithm SUPER in Fig. 3. Note that, by the head of 
a man’s (current) list, we mean the set of one or more women, tied in his list, whom he 
assign each person to be free; 
repeat 
while some man m is free do 
for each woman w at the head of m’s list do 
begin 
m proposes, and becomes engaged, to w; 
for each strict successor m’ of m on w’s list do 
begin 
if m’ is engaged to w then 
break the engagement; 
delete the pair (m’. w) 
end 
end; 
for each woman w who is multiply engaged do 
begin 
break all engagements involving W; 
for each man m at the tail of w’s list do 
delete the pair (m. w) 
end; 
until (some man’s list is empty) or (everyone is engaged); 
if everyone is engaged then 
the engagement relation is a super-stable matching 
else 
no super-stable matching exists 
Fig. 3. Algorithm SUPER 
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strictly prefers to all of the others in the list. Similarly, by the tail of a woman’s 
(current) list, we mean the set of one or more men, tied in her list, to whom she strictly 
prefers all of the others in the list. 
Correctness of Algorithm SUPER. We now establish the correctness of Algorithm 
SUPER with the aid of a number of lemmas. 
Lemma 3.1. If the pair (m, w) is deleted during an execution of Algorithm SUPER, then 
that pair cannot block any matching consisting of pairs that are never deleted. 
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that, in w’s list, m is a strict 
successor of any undeleted entries. 0 
Lemma 3.2. A matching generated by Algorithm SUPER is super-stable. 
Proof. Suppose that some execution of Algorithm SUPER generates matching M, 
and suppose that matching M is blocked by the pair (m, w). By Lemma 3.1, the pair 
(m, w) cannot have been deleted. So, if (m, w) blocks M, w must be at the head of m’s list, 
and so must be engaged to m. But the engagement mapping is one-one, so that m and 
w are partners in M, giving a contradiction. 0 
To complete the proof of the correctness of the algorithm, it will suffice to show that 
no super-stable pair is ever deleted during its execution. For then the algorithm can 
never fail to find a super-stable matching if one exists. 
Lemma 3.3. No super-stable pair is ever deleted during an execution of Algorithm 
SUPER. 
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that (m, w) is the first super-stable pair deleted 
during some execution of the algorithm. Let M be a super-stable matching in which 
m and w are partners. 
Case 1. Suppose that (m, w) is deleted as a result of some other man, say m’, 
becoming engaged to w. Then w strictly prefers m’ to m. Also, there is no super-stable 
matching in which m’ has a partner, say w’, whom he strictly prefers to w; for then the 
super-stable pair (m’, w’) would have been deleted before (m, w). So the supposed 
super-stable matching M is blocked by (m’, w), giving a contradiction. 
Case 2. Suppose that (m, w) is deleted as a result of w being multiply engaged. If m’ 
is any man who was engaged to w at that point, then m’ cannot have a super-stable 
partner w’ whom he strictly prefers to w, for the same reason as before. So once 
again the supposed super-stable matching M is blocked by the pair (m’, w), giving 
a contradiction. q 
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If Algorithm SUPER finds a super-stable matching, then, because of Lemma 3.3, no 
man can have a strictly better partner, or even a different partner of equal ranking, in 
any other super-stable matching. So, if super-stable matchings exist for a given 
problem instance, the algorithm always finds the one that is man-optimal in this 
precise sense. It follows that the nondeterminism arising from failure to specify the 
order in which the free men propose is immaterial to the outcome. Further, it is easy to 
see that man-optimal is woman-pessimal, in the sense that no woman can have 
a worse partner, or even a different partner of equal ranking, in any super-stable 
matching. 
We summarise our findings as a theorem. 
Theorem 3.4. For every instance of stable marriage with ties, Algorithm SUPER 
determines whether or not a super-stable matching exists. If such a matching does exist, 
all possible executions of the algorithm find the one in which every man has his strictly 
best, and every woman her strictly worst, super-stable partner. 
Analysis of Algorithm SUPER. As in the case of the extended Gale/Shapley algo- 
rithm, the total number of operations carried out during the execution of Algorithm 
SUPER is essentially bounded by a constant times the number of pairs deleted, and so 
the algorithm has an O(2) worst-case time bound. Furthermore, since the problem 
reduces to classical stable marriage in the case of strict preferences, the !2(n2) lower 
bound of [S] applies. 
4. Strongly stable matchings 
In this section we use the terms strongly stable pair and strongly stable partner with 
the obvious meaning, and the notion of a blocking pair is in the sense of strong 
stability. 
The problem of finding a strongly stable matching, if one exists, can be solved by 
a somewhat more elaborate extension of the Gale/Shapley algorithm. Each proposal 
sequence proceeds, as in the super-stable case, until some man’s list becomes empty, in 
which case there can be no strongly stable matching, or until all the men are engaged. 
In the latter case, if the bipartite graph representing the engaged pairs contains 
a perfect matching-i.e., if all the men and women can be paired off on a one-one basis 
with a fiance(e)-then the resulting matching is strongly stable. To explain how the 
algorithm proceeds if there is no such perfect matching, we need some terminology 
and some basic results dealing with matchings in bipartite graphs. 
It is well known that, if a bipartite graph G = (V, E), with V = X u Y and all the 
edges of E joining a vertex of X to a vertex of Y, has no perfect matching, then there 
must exist a dejicient subset of X (and of Y), i.e., a set of say r vertices in X which are 
collectively adjacent to fewer than r vertices in Y. To be more precise, the dejiciency of 
a subset Z of X is defined by S(Z) = 1 Z 1 - 1 N(Z) 1, where Jr/-(Z), the neighbourhood of 
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Z, is the subset of Y consisting of vertices that are adjacent to at least one vertex in Z. 
The deficiency 6(G) of G is the maximum deficiency taken over all subsets of X. The 
following is a classical theorem: 
Theorem 4.1. The maximum size of matching in a bipartite graph G is given by 
1x1 - d(G). 
A maximally dejicient subset of X is a subset Z such that 6(Z) = 6(G), and we shall 
call a subset of X critical if it is maximally deficient and contains no maximally 
deficient proper subset. It is not hard to show that, if Zr and Z, are maximally 
deficient, then so also is Zr n Z2, so that there is a unique critical subset of X. 
For a fuller discussion of these issues, see, for example, [4]. 
Returning to our algorithm for a strongly stable matching, it turns out that if the 
bipartite graph that embodies the engagements at the end of a proposal sequence 
contains no perfect matching, then no woman who is engaged to a man in the critical 
set can have any of her fiances, nor any man tied with them in her list, as a strongly 
stable partner. Hence all pairs of this kind may be deleted from the lists and the 
proposal sequence re-activated. 
The whole process continues until some man’s list becomes empty, in which case no 
strongly stable matching exists, or the bipartite graph of the engagement relation 
contains a perfect matching, in which case this matching is strongly stable. The 
algorithm appears as Algorithm STRONG in Fig. 4. 
Correctness of Algorithm STRONG. We now set about establishing the correctness 
of Algorithm STRONG. The first part of the argument is similar to that employed in 
Section 3 for Algorithm SUPER. 
Lemma 4.2. If the pair (m, w) is deleted during an execution of Algorithm STRONG, 
then that pair cannot block any matching consisting of pairs that are never deleted. 
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that, in w’s list, m is a strict 
successor of any undeleted entries. q 
Lemma 4.3. A matching generated by Algorithm STRONG is strongly stable. 
Proof. Suppose that some execution of Algorithm STRONG generates matching M, 
and suppose that matching M is blocked by the pair (m, w). By Lemma 4.2, the pair 
(m, w) cannot have been deleted. So, if (m, w) blocks M, w must be at the head of m’s list. 
So the only possibility is that w is tied with m’s partner in M and w strictly prefers m to 
her partner m’ in M. But m must have proposed to w, so that the pair (m’, w) must have 
been deleted, giving a contradiction. 0 
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assign each person to be free; 
repeat 
while some man m is free do 
for each woman w at the head of m’s list do 
begin 
m proposes, and becomes engaged, to w; 
for each strict successor m’ of m on w’s list do 
hegin 
if m’ is engaged to w then 
break the engagement; 
delete the pair (m’, w) 
end 
end; 
if the engagement relation does not contain a perfect matching then 
hegin 
find the critical set Z of men; 
for each woman w who is engaged to a man in Z do 
begin 
break all engagements involving w; 
for each man m at the tail of w’s list do 
delete the pair (m, w) 
end 
end 
until (some man’s list is empty) or (everyone is engaged); 
if everyone is engaged then 
any perfect matching in the engagement relation is strongly stable 
else 
no strongly stable matching exists 
Fig. 4. Algorithm STRONG. 
To complete the proof of the correctness of the algorithm, it will suffice to show that 
no strongly stable pair is ever deleted during its execution. For then the algorithm can 
never fail to find a strongly stable matching if one exists. 
Lemma 4.4. No strongly stable pair is ever deleted during an execution of Algorithm 
STRONG. 
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that (m, w) is the first strongly stable pair deleted 
during some execution of the algorithm. Let M be a strongly stable matching in which 
m and w are partners. 
Case 1. Suppose that (m, w) is deleted as a result of some other man, say m’, 
becoming engaged to w. Then w strictly prefers m’ to m. Also, there is no strongly 
stable matching in which m’ has a partner, say w’, whom he strictly prefers to w; for 
then the strongly stable pair (m’, w’) would have been deleted before (m, w). So the 
supposed strongly stable matching M is blocked by the pair (m’, w), giving a contradic- 
tion. 
Case 2. Suppose that (m, w) is deleted because w is engaged to a man in the critical 
set 2 at some point, and at that point m is at the tail of w’s list. We refer to the set of 
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lists at that point as the current lists. Let U = N(Z), let Z’ be the set of men in 2 who 
are matched in M with a woman from the head of their current list, and let U’ be the set 
of women in U who are matched in M with a man from the tail of their current list. Then 
w E U’, so that U’ is nonempty. Further, any man m’ in Z who is engaged to w must be in 
Z’, otherwise (m’, w) would block M, so that Z’ is nonempty. Also, Z\Z’ is nonempty, 
because IZI - 1 UI = 6(G) > 0, where G is the current engagement graph, while 
(Z’I - IU( I IZ’I - JU’I I 0, since every man in Z’ is matched in M with a woman in U’. 
Now, there must be an edge (x, y) in the engagement graph with x E Z\Z’ and 
y E U’. For otherwise JV(Z\Z’) s U\U’, and IZ\ZI - IJlr(Z\Z’)j 2 lZ\Z’ - 1 U\U’l 
= IZI - IV - (IZ’I - IU’I) 2 IZI - IV, since, as observed above, IZ’I - I U’I I 0; 
because Z\Z’ c Z, this contradicts the fact that Z is critical. This means that x strictly 
prefers y to his partner in M, and y is indifferent between x and her partner in M. 
So the supposed strongly stable matching M is blocked by the pair (x, y), giving 
a contradiction. 0 
If Algorithm STRONG finds a strongly stable matching, then because of Lemma 
4.4, no man can have a strictly better partner in any other strongly stable matching. 
So, if strongly stable matchings exist for a given problem instance, the algorithm 
always finds one that is man-optimal in this sense. Note that it may not be unique, 
since there may be alternative perfect matchings in the engagement graph. Further, it 
is easy to see that man-optimal is woman-pessimal, in the sense that no woman can 
have a worse partner in any strongly stable matching (though again there may be 
other strongly stable matchings in which she has a different partner of equal ranking). 
We summarize our findings as a theorem. 
Theorem 4.5. For every instance of stable marriage with ties, Algorithm STRONG 
determines whether or not a strongly stable matching exists. If such a matching does 
exist, all possible executions of the algorithm find one in which every man has as good 
a partner, and every woman as bad a partner, as in any strongly stable matching. 
Implementation and analysis of Algorithm STRONG. During each iteration of Algo- 
rithm STRONG, we need to search for a perfect matching in the bipartite graph 
formed by the engagement relation. Such a search may be carried out by a standard 
maximum cardinality matching algorithm. 
The key to the analysis of Algorithm STRONG is bounding the total amount of 
work done in finding maximum cardinality matchings in the engagement graph. Once 
such a matching is known, the critical set can easily be obtained, using, say, breadth- 
first search based on the following lemma, in which we continue to assume that our 
bipartite graph is based on vertex sets X of men and Y of women. 
Lemma 4.6. Given a maximum cardinality matching M in a bipartite graph G, the 
critical set C consists of the set U of unmatched men together with the set R of men 
reachable from them via an alternating path. 
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Proof. Let Z = U u R. It is immediate that 6(Z) = 6(G) ( = 1 U I), for if J(Z) were to 
contain a woman other than the mates in A4 of the men in R, then there would be an 
augmenting path relative to M, contradicting the maximality of M. 
Further, the critical set C must contain every man that is unmatched relative to 
some maximum cardinality matching in G. For if M’ is an arbitrary such matching (of 
size 1x1 - 6(G)), and if x E X is not matched in M’, then C must contain at least 
JCI - 6(G) + 1 matched men, with the implication that lJu^(C)l 2 [Cl - 6(G) + 1, or 
(Cl - I N(C)1 I 6(G) - 1, contradicting the required deficiency of C. 
But, for every x E R, there is a maximum cardinality matching in which x is 
unmatched, obtainable from M via an alternating path from a man in U to x. Hence, 
Z z C, and since 6(Z) = 6(C), the proof of the lemma is complete. 0 
As in the previous algorithms, work done other than in finding maximum match- 
ings and critical sets is essentially bounded by a constant times the number of deleted 
pairs, and so is O(n’). 
Suppose that during the ith iteration of the repeat loop, xi pairs are deleted because of 
the absence of a perfect matching in the engagement relation. These Xi pairs must 
include all the engaged pairs involving a man in the critical set Ci. Assuming that 
Algorithm STRONG finds a maximum cardinality matching Mi at the ith iteration, then 
the critical set Ci certainly includes all the men who are unmatched in Mi. Hence the 
number of pairs of Mi that are not deleted is at least n - Xi, if that number is positive. 
Suppose further that in the (i + 1)th iteration, yi of these matched pairs are deleted 
during the proposal sequence. Then at least n - Xi - yi pairs of Mi survive, so that in 
the (i + 1)th iteration we can start from these pairs and find a maximum cardinality 
matching in O(min(n2(xi + yi), n3)) time, by the augmenting path method (see, for 
example, [6, pp. 221-2241). 
Suppose that a total of m iterations are carried out, and that in k of 
these, min(n2(xi + y,), n3) = n3. Then the algorithm has time complexity 
O(n3 + kn3 + n2C(xi + yi)), where the first term is for the first iteration, and the sum is 
over the appropriate m - k - 1 values of i. But EYE, (xi + yi) < n2, since the total number 
of pairs is n2, and because xi + yi > n for the appropriate k values of i, it follows that 
or 
kn + C(xi + yi) I f (xi + yi) < n2 
i=l 
C(xi + yi) < n2 - kn 
where the sum is over the same m - k - 1 values of i. 
Hence the overall complexity of Algorithm STRONG is O((k + l)n3 + n2(n2 - kn)) 
= O(n”). 
5. Conclusion and open problems 
We have shown how the classical Gale/Shapley stable marriage algorithm can be 
extended to deal with cases in which the preference lists include ties and stability is 
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defined in one of three possible ways. In the cases of weak stability and super-stability, 
we described asymptotically optimal O(n’) algorithms that will find a matching of the 
appropriate kind (or will show that none exists, in the case of super-stability). We also 
presented an algorithm that will find a strongly stable matching, if one exists. This 
algorithm involves a rather more subtle extension of the basic Gale/Shapley method, 
but can be implemented to run in 0(n4) time using bipartite matching. It may be, 
however, that a more efficient implementation, or a more rigorous analysis, of 
Algorithm STRONG would lead to a tighter complexity bound. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the algorithms that we have described can easily 
be extended to the more general problem in which each person’s preferences are 
expressed as a partial order. This merely involves interpreting the “head” of each 
person’s (current) poset as the set of source nodes, and the “tail” as the set of sink 
nodes, in the corresponding directed acyclic graph. 
Finally, we pose the question of whether efficient algorithms can be found for 
a super-stable or strongly stable roommates matching, or whether, as with weak 
stability [7], these problems are NP-complete. 
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